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Article 5

INCOME TAX - FEDERAL TAX STATUS OF PERMANENT IMPROVEMENTS UNDER A BUSINESS LEASE

Introduction
In drafting the modern business lease, many future tax difficulties may be

avoided by an awareness of the tax status of improvements which the lessor or the
lessee may construct and maintain on the property by mutual agreement. This Note
will attempt to present an explanation of these tax implications. Particular emphasis will be placed on the theories underlying the decisions in this area, and the
practical considerations which should be considered in relation to projected improvements, particularly at the drafting stage of the lease. The Note is divided into
three sections: (1) the status of the lessor's improvements, (2) the lessee's improvements, and (3) the consequences of the lessee's improvements to both the lessor's
and the lessee's successors in interest.

Before discussing the various aspects of the problem, it is well to note some
specific points. First, we will be dealing with business property, viz., income producing improvements. As such, depreciation' and amortization 2 allowances will be
permitted, and will be a major problem confronting the draftsman. Second, a consideration of the tax aspects involved assumes that the preliminary questions of
accession of the lessee's improvements to the lessor and their status as part of the
realty have already been resolved, 3 and that these improvements are permanent, belonging to the lessor at the termination of the lease. If the improvements are to remain the property of the lessee, and are to be removed by him upon termination of the
lease, then the tax problem is a minor one. The lessee will be able to depreciate his
improvements as ordinary business assets, just as if they were in his own establishment, with no relevancy attaching to the lease, since the lessor will have no interest
in the improvements. Third, the status of trade-fixture improvements will not be
considered in this Note. Here it is well to note that if trade-fixtures are considered
the personal property of the tenant, it may determine whether a state real or
personal property tax will be assessed. 4 This, however, is a separate problem which
will not be considered here. Suffice it to say that the draftsman of a business lease
should determine his state's property tax law on trade-fixtures before deciding to
delete a provision in the lease determining the real versus personal property question.
I.

THE STATUS

OF THE LESSOR'S IMPROVEMENTS

When a lessor improves his property before leasing it, he is able to deduct an
aliquot part of the cost thereof during each year of the estimated useful life of the
improvement, thus recovering the capital investment through depreciation. For
example, a building costing $10,000 having an estimated useful life of ten years
and constituting income-producing property would allow a straight-line depreciation
deduction of $1000 per year for each taxable year of the improvement's useful life.
Although the improvement might still be in use at the end of the ten years, further
depreciation would not be allowed. This is in accordance with the basic accounting
theory that depreciation is not an attempt to analyze replacement costs, but is
rather an attempt to charge asset costs against operations.5 This depreciation is
deductible by the lessor even though the property as improved is in the hands of a
lessee, since the lessor has a basis in the property in his costs of constructing it, and
it is income-producing property as to him through the rents it produces. Both
requisites of depreciability under section 167 of the Internal Revenue Code (i.e.,
basis and depreciable interest) are met.
See
2 See
1

INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 167(a)-(f).
INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 178.
3 See generally, 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, §
OF PROPERTY, § 19 (Casner ed. 1952).
4 See 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 19.13

616-26, (3d ed. 1939); 5

AMERICAN

LAW

(Casner ed. 1952). The problem of real
personal property in terms of state rules does not exist in the federal income tax laws, since
in interpreting the Code, the courts look to the substance of the transaction, not to state rules.
See 10 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 61.01-61.09 (1958).
5

FINNEY & MILLER, PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTING -

116

INTERMEDIATE,

440 (4th ed. 1951).
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Tax problems occur in determining the period over which the improvements
are to be depreciated, however, when they are constructed by the lessor specifically
for the use of one lessee and as an inducement to him to lease the property. It has
been argued that if the improvements will have use to no one but the lessee, they
should be amortized over the life of the lease, even if their expected life exceeds it.6
This appears to be a reasonable approach, since if the improvement is to be useless
(i.e., no longer capable of producing income) to the lessor after the lease expires,
then the lessor should be allowed to take a realistic approach in amortizing the
improvement's total cost over the period in which it is producing income. This is
in apparent conflict with Income Tax Regulation 1.167 (a) (4) ,7 which states:
"Capital expenditures made by a lessor for the erection of... improvements shall
...
be recovered by him over the estimated life of the improvements without regard
to the period of the lease." This statement seems to preclude amortization of such
improvements over the life of the lease. Prior to the enactment of the 1956 regulation,' however, Laurene Walker Berger,9 a Tax Court decision, had phrased the
allowance in terms of amortization over the life of the lease. But, today this approach would appear no longer legally sound.
The Berger case is more interesting in another aspect, however. There the
Tax Court allowed a recovery of capital over the period of the lease on what might
appear to be a "negative improvement" - the razing of a building on the property
in order to make that property desirable to the lessee, who wished to construct a
parking lot. The Tax Court permitted amortization of the undepreciated basis of
the building over the lease period, holding that such cost was properly a cost of
obtaining the lease. It might seem, then, that the concept of "improvement" is
broadly interpreted to comprehend almost any economic loss to the lessor which will
make the premises more desirable to a proposed lessee.
But it seems a better view of the case would be to consider the undepreciated
cost of the razed building as not really in the nature of an improvement, but as a
cost to obtain a lease, such as broker's fees or attorney's fees. Thus it would be
amortizable over the lease term without any consideration of the "estimated life"
problem. Whichever view is taken, the case resolves the question of deductions for
amortization of razed structures in favor of the lessor.10
Under the ordinary situation the lessor will be able to deduct depreciation for
his income producing improvements on the leased property, whether or not the
improvements were made to attract a lessee. But, where the lessee agrees to maintain and repair the improvements, so as to return them in the same condition as received, the lessor sacrifices his depreciation deduction in favor of an expense deduction granted to the lessee. In Commissioner v. Terre Haute Electric Coll this proposition was graphically illustrated by the Seventh Circuit's denial of the depreciation deduction to a lessor who leased his property for 999 years, with the lessee
covenanting to "renew, repair and replace same, so as to maintain and keep the demised premises in as good order, repair and condition as same are now .... " The court
based its decision on Weiss v. Wiener,'2 which held that loss to the taxpayer is the
reason for depreciation allowances and pointed out that under the terms of the lease,
the lessee was to rectify all losses which the taxpayer might incur and since no loss
to the lessor would occur he would be denied any recoupment through depreciation.
This case does not represent too startling an analysis, since under a 999 year lease,
6 Schlesinger, Problems of Operating Large Structures, N.Y.U. 14th
279-85 (1956).

7 U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a)-4 (1956).
8 Ibid.
9 Laurene Walker Berger, 7 T.C. 1339 (1946).

10
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The same advantages do not apply to the lessor's successor in interest. See pp. 126-28

infra.
11 67 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 624 (1934).
12 279 U.S. 333 (1929).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
the lessor has, practically speaking, sold his property, and depreciation should not
be allowed. This reasoning has been paralleled in later3 cases where the transaction
was a more clear-cut lease problem. In Ben Turchin,' the Tax Court denied depreciation to the lessor under a lease of hotel property and fixtures, where there was
a covenant on the part of the lessee to "restore the premises to the same condition
as that existing at the time of entering upon same.... ." In addition, the lessee had
paid the lessor $59,000 by way of settlement of restoration fee demands for destruction of the property. The court, in holding that no lessor depreciation was allowable, again based the decision on the ground that no loss had occurred to the lessor
because of the restoration damages paid by the lessee.
What is actually occurring in these "return in the same condition" cases is indicated by Commissioner v. Saltonstall,4 where the court held that a taxpayer could
resume depreciation on property when its possession had been returned to him. Although the case did not relate specifically to a "return to the same condition" clause,
it is significant in that here the taxpayer leased property, did not depreciate it during the period in which it was outstanding, but attempted to depreciate it when it
returned to him, and was upheld in so doing by the First Circuit. It is apparent that
when a lessor is denied depreciation during the period of the lease, such denial actually defers the depreciation to a period to begin at the end of the lease, as occurred
in Saltonstall. For the tacit assumption in these cases is that the property, returned
to the lessor in its original condition, has not had its useful life diminished during
the period when the lessee occupied and repaired it. So if it had a fifty-year life at
the beginning of the lease, it should have a fifty-year life at the expiration thereof,
and the lessor could begin depreciating it at that time, over the fifty-year period.
If the property is not returned in the same condition, then, following the reasoning
of Turchin and Saltonstall, it would appear that the lessor would'only have a cause
of action for breach of covenant against the lessee, since the claim for repairs has
been substituted for the depreciation deduction.
Notably, the reasoning outlined above may run afoul of the realities of the lessee's failure to improve, making ordinary improvements and repairs but refusing to
be bound to major replacements. It appears that the courts have recognized this
problem, and have therefore denied depreciation only in the cases where it is unquestionable that the lessee must return to the lessor exactly what he received from
him. For example, in Terminal Realty Corp.'5 the lessor was allowed depreciation
on his improvements in the face of a lease provision stating: "The [lessees]... covenant and agree to keep and maintain the demised property in a good and safe condition, equally as good and safe as the same may be at this time or may be put at
any time during this lease.... ." The court, interpreting the lease provision narrowly,
held that here the lessee was required to make only ordinary repairs. In the absence
of a "return in the same condition" clause, however, obsolescence is not compensated
for by the lessee, although the lessee may be making ordinary inprovements, so the
taxpayer-lessor is entitled to a deduction for depreciation. Again, in Commissioner
v. Alaska Realty Co.'" the same narrow interpretation of a lease clause for repair
is evident. Following the Terminal case, the court allowed depreciation by the les,
sor, in the absence of a "return in the same condition" clause in the lease, since the
covenant did not cover ordinary obsolescence.
It seems, then, that the lease draftsman should be wary of clauses requiring repairs on the part of the lessee and, although the courts will interpret these narrowly,
should never place a "return in the same condition" clause in the lease unless the
lessor is willing to part with his depreciation deduction on improvements during
the lease term.
13 16 T.C. 1183 (1951).
14 124 F.2d 110 (lst Cir. 1941).
15 32 B.T.A. 623 (1935).
16 141 F.2d 675 (6th Cir. 1944).
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II. THE STATUS OF THE LESSEE'S IMPROVEMENTS:

Improvements by the lessee, whether bargained for or merely permitted, pose
several major tax problems to both lessor and lessee. At the outset, two problems
are evident from the lessor's point of view. First, are such improvements, when
merely permitted by the lessor and not required as part of the lease consideration,
properly includable in income for tax purposes? Second, assuming the lessee's improvements are properly includable as income, are they income in the year of lease
termination, when they actually pass to the lessor, or in the year of construction?
At first glance, it would appear that improvements built by a lessee which will
pass to the lessor upon lease termination are income to the lessor. Since he will receive property at the end of the lease which he did not possess at the beginning, he
realizes a value from the lease, over and above the rent he charges. This position
was taken by the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Bruun,37 which held that a lessor,
receiving improvements from a forfeiture of a leasehold, realized income for federal
tax purposes. In this case the Court rejected the lessor's argument that the claimed
gain was not severable from the value of the property and that no specific valuation
could be assigned to the improvement erected by the lessee, since it had become an
inseparable part of the estate leased. As such, claimed the lessor, the value had become an additional. increment of capital, and, therefore, should not be treated as
income until realized by gain on the sale of the property. The Bruun case is particularly interesting when compared to Commissioner v. Hewitt Realty Co.,:" where the
Second Circuit, five years before Bruun, had considered essentially the same problem, and had arrived at an opposite result. In Hewitt, the lessee had constructed a
building on the leasehold, which was to become the property of the lessor at construction, by covenant in the lease. The Commissioner had held that one year's
aliquot part of the total value of the improvement was income. The Second Circuit
reversed, holding that no income was realized, but merely an increase in capital
value, such as might arise from the bettering of the neighborhood of the leasehold.
Significantly, the improvement here was not in the nature of rent, but was built by
permission of the lessor. According to Judge Hand, the increased value received from
the lessee's improvement could only be determined with any degree of accuracy upon
the sale of the property. By analogy, if property were purchased and a basis for
capital gains purposes was determined at cost, and later betterments took place in
the neighborhood which enhanced the value of the property, such added increments
in value would be taxable as capital gains only when such "paper profits" finally
crystallized into actual gains by the sale of the property at a price in excess of the
determined cost. Notably, the actual value of the betterment, or improvement,
could not be determined until an actual gain was realized through the utilization
of the value increment by its sale. But even then, it would be impossible to apportion the sale price between the original property and the betterment - the two
would, as the lessor's counsel in the Bruun case maintained, be inseparable. Judge
Hand, in the Hewitt case, held that such improvements, being in the nature of intangible neighborhood betterments, should not be taxed as income either in the year
of construction or in the year of termination of the lease. Judge Chase, dissenting
in Hewitt, claimed that the improvement itself was rent, and thus taxable as current
income. He based his reasoning on the proposition that the lessee was in effect paying for the right to build by forfeiting the improvement. But notably, Judge Chase
did not attack the capital improvement argument of Judge Hand - even the dissenter in this case would apparently hold with the majority if he were satisfied that
there was no rent element involved.
However the reasoning in Hewitt was rejected by the Supreme Court in Bruun,
so it became the rule that the lessee's improvements were taxable to the lessor as
17

18

309 U.S. 461 (1940).

76 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1935).
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income, whether such improvements were treated as rent or not. Helvering v. Bruun
was consistently followed19 until 1942, when section 10920 of the present code was
enacted. This section treats all improvements by a tenant which pass to the lessor
as merely additions to capital, unless such were clearly rent.
Thus, it appears that whether or not Congress accepted the reasoning of Judge
Hand in the Hewitt case, the final result is the same. Improvements of the lessee,
if not required as rent, are non-taxable additions to the value of the leasehold until
realized as a capital gain by the lessor. This result is the same regardless of whether
the termination is by expiration or by forfeiture, or whether the termination is at
the time originally contemplated by the lessor and lessee or not.21
In determining what improvements are taxable as income, that is, what is rent,
the courts, in effect, have been very demanding in the "proof" required of the Commissioner. In M. E. Blatt Co. v. United States,22 the Supreme Court stated that,
"Even when required, improvements by lessee will not be deemed rent unless the
intention that they shall be is plainly disclosed."

23

This test, according to Blatt,

seems to be based upon the theory that rent is in the nature of a fixed and predetermined sum, to be paid at stated dates, not something so inestimable as a building or
other improvement on the leasehold.2 4
The Blatt test remains intact today, after being clarified somewhat in Cleveland
Trust Co., Trustee,25 where the intent to include improvements as rent was held not
to be plainly disclosed, and in Commissioner v. Cunningham,2 6 where the disclosure
of intent was held to be wanting in view not only of the agreement itself, but also
of "surrounding factors" such as the treatment of the transaction by the parties to
the lease. Grouping section 109, Regulation 1.109-1, and the Blatt case and those
decisions following it, it is apparent that the present law on determining what improvements made by the lessee are income is liberally construed in favor of the
lessor-taxpayer.
A word of caution, however, is in order to lessors who require replacement of
depreciating property by the lessee. Such lessors would do well to keep any excess
of settlement funds paid in lieu of replacements separate from the full cost of the
actual replacements made. The lessor must show that settlement funds are actually
applicable to replacements or they will be taxed as income. In Washington Fireproof
Building Co.,2 7 the lessee fulfilled his agreement to replace depreciated property by
a lump-sum payment of $39,000. The Tax Court held that the amount in excess
of actual replacement expense was income in the nature of rent, reasoning that first,
a replacement cost payment would not be income, but a return of capital, yet the
28
burden of showing that this payment is actually for replacement is on the taxpayer,
and second, if it were possible to determine the excess of the amount received over
replacement costs, only that amount would be taxable, but since the lessor did not
sustain this burden, and show the excess, the entire amount would be taxable as income, except for the amount actually spent on replacements.
19 See Greenwood Packing Plant v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1942); Commissioner v. Hills Corp., 115 F.2d 322 (10th Cir. 1940); Joseph Kennard Skillings, 41 B.T.A.
888 (1940); Estate of Austin C. Brant, 44 B.T.A. 1306 (1941).
20 INT. REV. CODE of 1954 § 109 states: "Gross income does not include income (other
than rent) derived by a lessor of real property on the termination of a lease, representing the
value of such property attributable to buildings erected or other improvements made by the
lessee."
21 Commissioner v. Cunningham, 258 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1958); U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.1091 (a) (1956).
22 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
23 Id. at 277. Accord, Duffy v. 'Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55 (1925).
24 Ibid.
25 39 B.T.A. 113 (1939).
26 258 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1958).
27 31 B.T.A. 824 (1934).
28 Id. at 827; accord, Cataract Ice Co., 23 B.T.A. 654 (1931).
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In contrast to this extreme position, but following the same reasoning to a contrary result, is Hamilton and Main, Inc.2 9 There, with an effective showing that
the lump-sum settlement payment was equal to the amount of repairs made, the
court held such a settlement to be merely a return of capital, and as such, not taxable as income.
Section 109 of the Internal Revenue Code, although it repudiates the treatment
of the lessee's improvements as income to the lessor, does not allow the lessor to receive such improvements completely tax-free. It is well to note that such improvements are not added to the lessor's basis of the property for either depreciation purposes or for capital gains computation purposes. Section 1019 of the 1954 Code, as
amended, states: "Neither the basis nor the adjusted basis of any portion of real
property shall, in the case of the lessor of such property, be increased or diminished
on account of income derived by the lessor in respect of.such property and excludable from gross income under section 109. .. ."
Hence, if the lessee builds improvements on the lessors property, and such improvements are not rent, they are not taxable as income either in the year of construction or at lease termination, when they will become the property of the lessor.
But the lessor will be taxed at capital gains rates upon the sale of the property, since
he will be taxed on the additional increment of value represented by the improvements, which cannot be added to his adjusted basis.30 For example: If the lessee
builds improvements worth $50,000 on a $100,000 leasehold, such improvements not
being rent, and such improvements pass to lessor at the lease's termination, the improvements will not be taxable as income. But upon sale of the leasehold, assuming
its market value has been increased $50,000, the receipt would be $150,000. The
basis would remain at $100,000 and thus the lessor would be taxed at capital gains
rates on $50,000. This situation is in accord with Judge Hand's reasoning in the
Hewitt case - the taxation of the improvement has been treated exactly as if it
were in the nature of an intangible enhancement of property value, such as a neighborhood betterment would be - the income has been deferred, until its actual value
has been determined. But significantly, since capital gains taxation rates are lower
than income taxation rates, the lessor has realized an advantage from this position,
as opposed to the result under the Bruun case. But, considering the realities of the
situation, such an advantage appears justified for, although the lessee may have
spent $50,000 to construct the improvement, its value may not be that high upon
transfer to the lessor, and under the Bruun rule the lessor would probably be taxed
at surtax rates on the full $50,000. Again, the value of the improvement will probably decline before sale of the property by the lessor, since the lessee will have
made extensive use of it. And in leases where improvements are involved, the lease
term is usually comparatively long, thus a considerable period of time will probably
elapse before the lessor will be able to dispose of the property. Considering these
factors, it appears that the section 109 rule is wise since it treats the lessee's improvements realistically by deferring the income therefrom until it is actually realized
by the lessor.
On the other hand, the logical extension of the rule, reflected in both sections
109 and 1019 of the Code, would require improvements which are made by a lessee
in lieu of rent to be taxable as ordinary income. Also, since such improvements are
taxed as ordinary income, they are properly includable as capital investment items,
and are proper additions to the adjusted basis of the leasehold.3 ' That this is the
realistic approach is apparent when we realize that in such a case the lessor is, in
effect, selling the use of his property to obtain a further capital investment in lieu
of using his own funds to improve the property.
29 25 T.C. 878 (1956).
30 See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 109, 1019; U.S. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.109-1 (1956),
1.1019-1 (1957).
31 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 1011, 1019.
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Therefore, the lessor can have one of two choices: (1) allow the lessee to construct improvements which will pass to the lessor upon lease termination, without
taxation as income, but with probable taxation as a capital gain, or (2) require such
improvements of the lessee as rent, and pay an ordinary income tax on them, with
a corresponding increase in the lessor's adjusted basis of the property for capital
gains purposes. The draftsman should keep these choices in mind, and be certain
that his phraseology places the status of improvements by the lessee clearly in one
of the above categories. Perhaps the best way in which the lessor can secure
an advantage under the present Code would be to permit the improvements,
not require them as rent, and then use them himself upon lease termination,
until their useful life has expired, before selling the property. The lessor should
generally attempt to utilize the capital gains advantage2 permitted him by employing
the permissive, rather than compulsory, improvement.
Assuming, however, that the improvements are properly taxable to the lessor as
rent, it is well to examine the question of when they are taxable - in the year of
completion, or in the year of lease termination. This problem has been a difficult
one for the courts since 1919 when it first arose in the case of Miller v. Gearin.as In
that case, the Ninth Circuit held, in reasoning which is still accepted in the rent
problem area today, that if leasehold improvements are to be income to the lessor,
they are income in the year of construction. The improvements become the property
of the lessor at construction, and the lessor merely gets the possession of what he
already owns in the year of lease termination. Although the Miller case, and the
line of cases following it, are not all cases in which the improvements are treated
as rent, they are relevant to a consideration of the effect of rent-improvements today,
simply because they all assume the issue that the improvements are taxable. For example, the case of Joseph L. B. Alexander,34 which is not a rental case but one assuming the lessee's improvements to be income to the lessor, holds that such income
is taxable in the year of improvement construction, whether the lessor is on the cash
or the accrual basis of accounting. In that case, a taxpayer-lessor who kept his books
on the cash basis, not recording income until actually received, regardless of when
earned, argued that the improvements of his lessee were not income in the year of
construction, since they were not received until the year of lease termination. The
court rejected this argument, holding that the mandate of Miller v. Gearin required
that improvements be treated as income in the year of their construction, regardless
of the particular accounting methods of the taxpayer. By comparison, there is the
more current case of Brown v. Commissioner,36 where again a cash basis taxpayer
attempted to assert that the rent which she received from a lessee by way of his
improvement was not taxable as income, since she kept her books on the cash basis.
The court held, on the same reasoning as in the Alexander case, that the amount
of such improvement was properly taxable as rent in the year earned, regardless of
when actually received. 6
The Miller approach was again emphasized with regard to a rental situation in
Durkheimer Investment Co., where the Board of Tax Appeals, dealing with a rentimprovement situation, and relying explicitly on the Miller case, held
3 7 the lessee's improvements to be income to the lessor in the year of construction.
32 Under INT. Rzv. CoDE of 1954, § 1202, capital gains rates will generally be considerably lower than corresponding income tax rates.
33 258 Fed. 225 (9th Cir. 1919).
34 13 B.T.A. 1169 (1928).
35 220 F.2d 12 (1955).

36 'This case represents an extremely interesting fact situation in the area of joint improvements of the lessor and the lessee. Here the lessor agreed to contribute to the construction of

improvements, partly in cash and partly by rent credits. She did so, and then claimed the rent
credit, which was actually in the nature of an improvement in lieu of rent, was not taxable
in the year the credit was given, the same year as the improvement was built.
37 36 B.T.A. 423 (1937); accord, Julia Willms Sloan, 36 B.T.A. 370 (1937); Louise C.
Slack, 35 B.T.A. 271 (1937).
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In 1938, the landmark case of M. E. Blatt Co. v. United Statess held, assuming that improvements other than rent were income, that there was no rental
element in the improvements under consideration, and that the improvements, if income at all, were taxable at lease termination, and could not be taxed during the
lease term. Since the assumption of the Blatt case, i.e., that income includes improvements other than rent, has been foreclosed to the contrary by section 109 of
the Code, the only type of improvement upon which the Blatt rule could be operative is rent improvements. And since rent improvements, under the Code, are held
taxable in the year of construction as advance rental payments, 39 the Miller rule seems
to apply to the only type of lessee's improvements which are income to the lessor.
As such, the Blatt case is stripped of much of its meaning, but it is still important in
that it sets down the test to determine when improvements are rent, a test which is
very liberal to the lessor.
Let us now examine the status of the lessee in a situation -where he (1) improves the property by requirement of the lessor, as rent, or (2) improves the property by permission, not as rent. In the first situation, where the improvements are
rent, the lessee has a deduction over the period of the lease for the expense involved.40 This deduction springs from the treatment of the improvements as an
ordinary item of rent expense, and as such, it is deductible as a business expense
of the lessee over the period of the lease.41 The theory of the Main case, and the
reason for the spreading of the rental, is simply that such improvement is a payment
benefiting the lessee over the entire lease period, and thus should be shown as an
expense over that period. Conversely, as indicated previously, the lessor now has
an addition to his basis for depreciation, -and can depreciate the fair market value
of the lessee's improvements over their useful life.
But in the second situation, where the lessee improves the property by the lessor's permission, and not as rent, difficult depreciation problems arise. Of course, it
is generally accepted that the lessee may depreciate the improvement since it is in
the nature of a capital investment made by him - just as though he had built an
improvement on his own property. Notably, the previously mentioned criteria of
the Blatt case for distinguishing rental improvements from merely permissive improvements applies here - that is, the distinguishing factor is the intent of the
parties, as manifested by all surrounding circumstances, with the tendency being to42
ward a very narrow interpretation of rent improvements. In addition to the probrental or merely permisare
the
improvements
not
or
whether
lem of determining
sive, there is the much-litigated question of the proper depreciation period - will
the improvements be depreciated over the term of the lease, or the life of the improvement? Generally, it is held that improvements depreciable by the lessee are
to be depreciated over the life of the improvements or over the lease term, whichever is shorter.43 The problem, however, occurs in determining the life of the lease
where an option to purchase exists, or options to renew are present. In the Leonard
Refineries" case, the Tax Court held that where the lessee leased property, erected
improvements, and later bought the leased property under an option to purchase,
the lessee should have been depreciating the improvements over their useful lives
without regard to the term of the lease. The test used by the court is the generally
accepted method employed in the option situation. It is a test that might be characterized as "retrospective probability." The court looked in retrospect to the period
in question, where the exercise of the option was uncertain, and analyzed the proba38 305 U.S. 267 (1938).
IN r. REv. CODE of 1954 § 61 (a) (5); U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-3 (c) (1958).
40 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 162 (a) (3).
41 Main & McKinney Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1940); accord,
Your Health Club, 4 T.C. 385 (1944).
42 See Duffy v. Central R.R., 268 U.S. 55 (1925).
43 U.S. Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a) (4) (1956).
44 11 T.C. 1000 (1948).
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bilities of the exercise of the option. The court then went on to conclude that it was
obvious at the time in question that the corporation would exercise its option to buy.
Also significant in this area, dealing specifically with renewal options rather than
purchase options, are the cases which Leonard Refineries followed.4"
Perhaps it might be argued that, in this retrospective view, the courts could always conclude in accord with the present realities of the situation, i.e., whether the
lease option has actually been exercised, without regard to the probability of it being
so exercised at the time the depreciation or amortization method was adopted. But
the courts disclaim any such attitude, as in 1620 Broadway Corp.,.0 where the Board
of Tax Appeals expressly refused to use its present knowledge of the ultimate exercise of the renewal option, and dealt with the probabilities of the situation at the time
the option exercise was still in the offing, and the depreciation was set up on the
basis of the life of the improvements. Again, in Bonwit Teller v. Commissioner,47
where the Second Circuit had no knowledge of the ultimate resolution of the option
issue, the court accepted the challenge of retrospective prediction, and analyzed the
past probabilities of option exercise, holding that there was no evidence to show that
the lease would be renewed, thus amortization was the proper method of handling
the write-off of capital value against income.
The Alamo Broadcasting Co8 case seemed to indicate a more mechanical approach to the problem, with no discussion of the probabilities that the lease option
would be renewed. But immediately following it is the case of Hens & Kelly, Inc.,4
which, in denying the argument that a reappraisal clause in the lease (whereby the
future rents are to depend on reappraisal at the renewal date of the lease) necessarily
dictates the renewal of the lease, vividly exemplifies the determination of the Tax
Court to give full vitality to the retrospective probability test in this area. The court
held that the renewal was probable, not because of the reappraisal or any fixed rule,
but on the basis of the actions of the lessee. The court treats this probability of renewal as a fact question, and determines it as such. Hens & Kelly is probably the
best present example of the method applied by the Tax Court in this area, and it
indicates a heavy emphasis on the facts of the particular situation surrounding the
renewal option. Again this approach is apparent in Jos. N. Neel Co.,50 where petitioner-lessee agreed to construct an improvement on the leasehold in the amount
of $250,000 and agreed that his failure to do so would alternatively require him to
pay the lessor the amount not so expended. The Tax Court held this amount to be
deductible over the period of the original lease plus the renewal period, since there
was a strong possibility of renewal even though nothing had been built or paid at
the time of the decision. In all of these cases the same pattern of decision is apparent. It is an evaluation of renewal possibilities with the decision being based upon
what the court thinks the lessee would probably do when he determines whether to
depreciate or amortize the improvement in question. If it is apparent that at that
time the lessee will exercise his option to purchase or renew the lease, the court will
then decide that the asset must be depreciated over its estimated useful life. If, on
the other hand, renewal or purchase is improbable the court will hold that amortization is in order, over the original term of the lease, without regard for the life of
the improvement.
In the case of the month to month lessee, the problem of depreciation versus
amortization is clear. According to Emma C. Mcllwayne,5 1 relying on Bowman v.
45 Commissioner v. Pittsburgh Union Stockyards Co., 46 F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1931); 1620
Broadway Corp., 36 B.T.A. 149 (1937).
46 36 B.T.A. 149 (1937).
47 53 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 690 (1932).
48 15 T.C. 534 (1950).
49 19 T.C. 305, 303-28 (1952).
50 22 T.C. 1083 (1954).
51 21 P-H Tax Ct. Mem., 861 (1952).
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Commissioner5 2 improvements by a month-to-month lessee are depreciable over
their estimated life, without regard to any probability of lease continuation. In both
cases, the court emphasized that this type of improvement may not be deducted as
a business expense in the year of construction, and depreciation based upon the estimated useful life of the improvements is in order. This appears to be the reasonable rule, since there is usually no evidence to resolve the question of how long the
lessee will remain on the property, or how long the improvements will remain in his
possession. If, however, the lease is to terminate before the improvements have been
fully depreciated, then it is apparent that the lessee will be able to deduct the remammg undepreciated value of his capital investment in the improvements as an
abandonment loss, according to Mcllwayne.
The courts have been rather liberal in allowing a write-off of the undepreciated
or unamortized improvements of a lessee in the year of the lease termination. That
such a write-off is in order is readily seen since the lessee's improvements are treated
as a capital asset and are depreciated as such. In the event of an abrupt destruction
of the lessee's interest, for example, a premature lease termination, the lessee may
write off the loss on capital assets just as he would in the event they burned down.
This is indicated in the month-to-month lessee situation, by Mclwayne, and is even
more clearly exemplified in Robert Coffey 3 where the Board of Tax Appeals allowed
the write-off upon lease termination on the probability that the taxpayer made the
improvements with an intent to exercise an option to purchase. As such, the court
found that the taxpayer's failure to exercise the option deprived him of property
which he improved in expectation of ultimate ownership, so the taxpayer sustained
a loss. Although this approach is perhaps unique, it is perfectly in accord (in result)
with the rule enunciated in Appeal of Mandel Bros., 4 where taxpayer-lessee who
had improved the property was forbidden to continue the amortization of the improvements which he had built and then razed under a lease covenant, but was ordered to write off the capital loss on the old improvement at the time his interest
in it was destroyed.
In the case of the related lessor and lessee, no problem of depreciation-amortization is present. Under Code section 178, 55 a related lessor-lessee situation
will allow the lessee to depreciate his improvements only over their estimated useful
life, without regard for the lease term. Apparently this provision was passed to avoid
the situation where the lessor, wishing to improve his property, leases it to a related
person who then makes the improvement and amortizes his capital investment over the
short lease term, and subsequently passes the property back to the lessor. The lessor
thereby receives his improvements while the lessee has the advantage of a quick
write-off, assuming a short lease term. Under the present Code, such a write-off is
defeated. "
The situation of the lessee's improvements seems to resolve itself to the following: the lessee's improvements will be income to the lessor only in cases where they
are expressly intended as rent,57 and this intent must be clearly shown. If the lessor
desires a depreciable interest in the lessee's improvements, then he will want such
improvements to be in the nature of rent. On the other hand, if he wishes to take
advantage of the capital gains feature involved in treating the improvements as nonrent items, he will merely permit such improvements, clearly drafting the lease
to show that they are not rent. The draftsman advising -the lessor would do
well to note the alternatives presented to the lessor in this respect and, if desirable, take advantage of the capital gains features permitted rather than seeking a
52 32 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
53 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931).
54

4 B.T.A. 341, 350-51 (1926).

55 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 178 (b).
56 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 178 (b); But see, Fort Wharf Ice Co., 23 T.C. 202
(1954).
57 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 109.
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depreciable interest in the improvements. This would seem to be the better approach
because, in order to get such an interest, the improvements must be in the nature
of rent ab initio, and thus they would be taxable as ordinary income to the lessor.
The lessee, on the other hand, can begin to deduct the total cost of such improvements upon their construction, if they are rent. But it should be noted that
these improvements will be treated as advance rentals, and they must be apportioned
over the period of the lease, in spite of the fact that the improvements are income
to the lessor in the year of construction. On the other hand, if the improvements
are not in the nature of rent, the lessee may depreciate or amortize them, in the
ordinary case, over the useful life or over the lease term, whichever is shorter. If the
lessee does not fully deduct his capital investment over the lease term, and if there
is still an unamortized or undepreciated balance left at lease termination, then such
balance is properly deductible as a loss in the year of termination. The draftsman
advising the lessee should keep these corresponding alternatives in mind when deciding whether the lease is to require improvements as rental items or permit them
as non-rental improvements. Also, he should be careful to clarify any renewal option provision, and advise the lessee to sustain the decision to depreciate over the
life of the improvements or amortize over the lease term by a careful evaluation of
the probability of exercise of such option to renew or purchase, assuming the life
of the improvements extends beyond the lease term. Decisions as to whether the
rent deduction or a depreciation deduction or an amortization deduction is desirable
to the lessee will vary according to the lessee's desire for a quick write-off or a longterm deduction of the improvement.
III. THE

CONSEQUENCES OF THE LESSEE'S IMPROVEMENTS TO BOTH LESSOR'S AND
LESSEE'S SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST

A third problem remains to be treated in discussing the income tax status of
leasehold improvements. That is the general problem area of the basis for computing gain from sale and the depreciable interest in the improvements in reference to
the successor of the lessor and lessee.
The basic problem involved here is clearly brought out by First Nat'l Bank of
Kansas City v. Nee,58 where the lessor's executor attempted to depreciate the lessee's
non-rental improvements on the leasehold, which were to revert to the lessor at the
termination of the lease. Notably, the lessor had no depreciable interest in the improvements, and would have had no addition to his adjusted basis for the building
for capital gains purposes, simply because the lessor had made no capital investment
in the building.5 9 But, argued the executor, under the provisions of the Code, 6which
include the improvements of the lessee in the estate for estate tax purposes, 0 and
by virtue of their inclusion and taxation as such, the improvements should be added
to the lessor's successor's basis, and should be depreciable. The court emphasized
that
the controlling inquiry is whether, in the situation under review, regardless
of who technically owns the wasting improvements, the claimant of depre-

ciation holds it for the production of income for the claimant's benefit, and
.. . a substihas in it a cost basis or, within the meaning of the statutes,
61
tute basis upon which depreciation may be computed.

Thus the court notes two major elements of depreciation which will be considered
here: (1) has the successor-estate a depreciable interest since he holds the property
(2) has he a cost or other
for the production of income for his own benefit, 6and
acceptable basis for depreciation in the property? 2 Regarding this problem, the
58
59
60

190 F.2d 61 (8th Cir. 1951).

See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1019, and note 30 supra, and accompanying text.
INT. REv. CODE of 1939, § 113 (a) (5); now INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014 (a).

61 190 F.2d 61, 68 (1951).
62 This inquiry pertains to current § 1014 (a) of the IRC, which is the same as
previous § 113 (a) of the 1939 Code, under which many of the following cases in this discussion were decided.
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court in First National held that no depreciation is allowable to the successor of the.
lessor, since the improvements are not income-producing property to him. The improvements may well be taxable for estate tax purposes, and may have a basis for
that reason, but basis is only one of the requirements for depreciation. The other
element, income production regarding the claimant, is missing, since, as to the
claimant, the income producing feature of the lease was the unimproved leasehold.
That was what the lessor leased in the first place, and that is the source of the rent
income to the successor. This reasoning appears to be in line with Helvering v. Lazarus and Co.,63 where the Supreme Court said, "The Federal Income Tax is aimed
at net income determined from gross income, less items such as necessary expenses
incurred or capital consumed in earning it." " The Court thus allowed a claimant
to depreciate property even thbugh legal title was in another, if the taxpayer had a
depreciable capital investment. Again, the same test of depreciability is laid down
a capital investment of some sort, giving rise to a basis, and some type of property producing income to the taxpayer from that capital investment. Although
the First National case bases its rejection of the lessor's successor's depreciation on
the element of "no income production," it would seem that a more persuasive approach would be to deny any basis at all for depreciation purposes, since no capital
investment has been made, except perhaps the payment of an estate tax.65 It appears, however, that the courts prefer to base their denial of depreciation on the
former ground, that is, that the improvements are not income-producing property
to the successor of the lessor. This is evident in Commissioner v. Moore"6 which
holds the lessor's successor cannot depreciate the lessee's non-rental improvements
which will revert to him at termination, even though a basis is provided by the estate tax provision, section 113 (a) of the 1939 Code and section 1014 (a) of the
current Code. The court holds that there is no depreciable interest in the lessor or
his successor, as to the improvements, since the life of the improvements is shorter
than the lease term. Thus, the successor has no interest in a wasting asset, but, in
reality, has only a reversionary interest in a building which theoretically is worthless
at the end of the lease term. He has a reversion in nothing, to extend the reasoning
of the court to its ultimate conclusion. As the facts indicate in Goelet v. United
States,6 7 the improvement was a building which was estimated to have a life of eight
years. This life was less than the lease term (10 years) so nothing except the leasehold would revert to the successor at the end of the lease. Theoretically the building would not exist as a useful asset at the end of the lease term. This appears to
be the "no income producing property" argument of the First National Bank case.
For, if there was no improvement on the property when it was leased, and there was
none on the property when the lease was terminated, then the income-producing
element of the leasehold consists only of the property originally leased, devoid of
improvements. The rental amount would be the same, the income would be the
same, whether the improvement were on the property or not - because the lessee
covenanted to pay a set amount of rent for the leasehold itself - he did not rent
the building which he himself built. Several other recent cases, (e.g., Albert L.
Rowan,68 and Commissionerv. Pearson6 9 ) indicate the same reasoning. In Pearson,the
Fifth Circuit held that the only income-producing property which was taxed for estate
tax purposes was the original land, exclusive of improvement, and therefore no consideration was given to the improvements as income-producing property. The holding
63 308 U.S. 252 (1939).
64 Id. at 254.
65 See also, Bonwit Teller, Inc., 46 B.T.A. 978 (1942).
66 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Accord, Goelet v.
United States, 161 F. Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd. per curiam, 266 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1959).
67 Supra, note 66.
68 22 T.C. 865 (1954).
69 188 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1951).
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in the Rowan case similarly allows no depreciation by the successor, since no incomeproducing property other than the leasehold, devoid of improvements, can be shown
to have been taxed for estate tax purposes. Here, again, we find the same basic idea
the lessor leased only the original property, which is what is producing the income, and that the improvements, not producing income to either the lessor or his
successor, are not depreciable by them.
Thus we find that the courts emphasize this "lack of income-producing" property argument in denying depreciability of the lessee's improvements by the lessor's
successor. It might have been called the "lack of a wasting asset" in Moore and
Goelet, and the "impossibility to sever the taxable basis of the improvement from
that of the original leasehold" in Pearson and Rowan. But regardless of what it is
called, the courts seemingly will not find a depreciable interest in the lessee's improvements for a lessor or his successor, even though as successor he acquires a basis
in the property within the meaning of section 1014(a). The courts do not mention
the argument that such basis is not supported by an original capital investment by
the lessor, but this factor might easily be an undercurrent in their thinking, since it
is strongly suggestive of a successor attempting to reap where neither he nor the
original lessor have sown. Again, although only mentioned in Moore, there would
be something anomalous about allowing two people, the lessor's successor and the
lessee, to depreciate the same asset simultaneously, and this would be permitted by
a contrary rule."° Hence, it would appear that the rule of non-depreciability of the
lessee's improvements by a lessor's successor is a wise one, but the same reasoning
would militate against the sensibility of taxing lessor's successor for estate tax purposes on improvements. Although Pearson and Rowan evade this by saying that the
fair market value of the leasehold, as taxed, might easily be only the original unimproved value of the leasehold, it is an inescapable conclusion that in most cases the
lessor's successor will be taxed on an improvement which will never become his by
reversion (at least in theory, according to Moore and Goelet), since it will have
wasted away by the expiration of the lease. Further, the successor cannot compensate himself for this loss through depreciation.
The estate taxation under section 1014 does appear to benefit the successor of
the lessor in one way, however, since it allows him to increase his capital gains basis
to include the amount of the improvements.7 1 This seems to be assumed without
conflict in the prior cases discussing the successor's depreciation.
Problems of the lessee's successor seem to be relatively straightforward and minor
in this area, assuming that the successor acquires the same interest that the lessee
had in the property.72 If so, the improvements present no apparent problems. In
2
Cogar v. Commissioner"
the right of the lessee's assignee to depreciate the lessee's
improvements under the lease was upheld, even though, under the lease, title to
these improvements vested in the lessor upon their completion since the right to
depreciate is not confined to the owner of a fee. The petitioner-successor here, buying the rights of the lessee to the income-producing improvements, was entitled to
depreciate them as the lessee himself, over the remaining term of the lease or the
life of the improvements, whichever was shorter.
The liberality of the courts in allowing a lessee's successor to stand in the position of the lessee in regard to improvements is shown vividly in Millinery Center
Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner,74 where the taxpayer-lessee in effect succeeded him70 See Charles Bertram Currier, 7 T.C. 980 (1946).
71 Buelterman v. United States, 155 F.2d 597 (8th Cir. 1946).

72 If the successor is a sublessee, the original lessee is placed in the position of a lessor as

to the sublessee, and the same considerations regarding lessor's improvements will apply to the
two parties, as indicated in Section I of this discussion. Section II of the Note, THE TENANT'S
IMPROVEMENTS, will apply as between lessee and sublessee, and will continue to apply between
the original lessor and lessee.
73 44 F.2d 554 (6th 'Cir. 1930), rehearing denied, 51 F.2d 501 (1931).
74 221 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1955).
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self by leasing property, constructing improvements, depreciating them fully over
the life of the lease, and then buying the fee from the lessor. The Second Circuit
held that the lessee-purchaser could depreciate that portion of the purchase price allocable to the building, since "a third party purchaser of such a fee would be entitled
to allocate part of its cost to the building and to depreciate it as such." 75 In affirming, the Supreme Court held"0 that petitioner could validly deduct the amount of
the purchase price allocable to the improvement, as depreciation, over the remaining useful life of the building.
Conclusion
Although the area of leasehold improvements has been uncertain in the past,
the present income tax law in the area has become relatively settled into what is
probably the most reasonable and fair solution to the problems involved. The law
is reasonably certain since sections 109 and 1019 of the present Code resolve questions of income to the lessor upon the lessee's improving the land, and the problem
of basis in this area.
The basic rules to be mastered by the draftsman of leases in this area, then,
are: (1) where the improvements of the lessee are not intended as rentals, they
are not taxable to the lessor either at construction or at lease termination; but on
the other hand, they are not depreciable by the lessor, nor do they increase his
adjusted basis in the property. Conversely, this type of improvement is depreciable
by the lessee over either the period of the lease or the life of the improvement,
whichever is shorter.
(2) If the improvements are intended as rent (under the Blatt rule this intent
must clearly be shown), then they are taxable as income to the lessor, they are depreciable by him over their estimated life, and they do increase his adjusted basis
for capital gains purposes. Conversely, the lessee does not have a depreciable interest in the property, but will get a deduction for the investment in improvements
by way of a pro-rata deduction of the cost of the improvement over the life of the
lease, as rent expense.
The lease draftsman should indicate these alternatives to both lessor and lessee,
allowing them to decide whether to consider the improvements as rent according
to their particular business needs and their present deduction position.
Uncertainty in the law, however, is apparent in certain areas of improvements,
primarily in cases where the lessee has agreed to repair and maintain improvements
of the lessor, where renewal or purchase options are present in the lease, and where
the rights of the lessor's and the lessee's successors in interest, in regard to depreciation of the improvements and acquisition of a basis for depreciation and capital gains
purposes within the estate tax valuation of the improvements are concerned. Here
prudence must be exercised.
Where the lessee has agreed to repair and maintain the improvements of the
lessor, the danger is that a clause requiring the lessee to "return the property to the
lessor in its original condition" might be inserted without realizing its full import.
The courts have interpreted repair clauses very narrowly, and have seldom found
a clause which does not explicitly provide for the return in the same condition to
be a reason for denying the lessor his depreciation on the improvements. But it must
be kept in mind that if the lessor requires the lessee to make such replacements, the
lessor will not be able to depreciate the property during the term of the lease, for
the asset will not be wasting if lessee is keeping it in its original condition. Repair
clauses will not preclude the lessors depreciation, however, as long as they do not
demand this "original condition" of the property at its return.
Problems arise as to renewal and purchase options in a lease, in determining
whether an improvement built by a lessee, with a useful life of longer than the
75 Id. at 324.
76
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lease term, are to be depreciated over that life or amortized over the lease term. Here
the problem is almost completely a matter of judicial interpretation, with the courts
using the retrospective probability approach and is determined by the probability of
lease renewal at the time that the depreciation-amortization decision is made. If
the probability is that the lease will be renewed or the option exercised, the improvement must be depreciated over its life - if non-renewal is expected, amortization
over the lease term is proper. Although a lease draftsman cannot ascertain this
probability at the drafting stage, he should counsel the parties to the lease at its inception to support their depreciation-amortization decisions by evidence of probable
renewal or non-renewal.
As regards the lessor's successor, there are advantages available which were not
available to his predecessor. The successor will acquire a basis for capital gains purposes in the improvements built by the lessee under the lease. Assuming they are
non-rental improvements, this is a basis which the original lessor never possessed.
This basis is acquired by reason of the estate tax valuation of the property. But this
basis is not enough to give the lessor's successor a depreciable interest in the property
for the improvements are not income-producing property as to the successor, since
the income-producing element of the lease is the original leasehold.
Problems of the lessee's successor are actually the same as those of the lessee
himself, since the lessee's successor will stand in the same position as the lessee, with
no different position afforded him when he takes by inheritance, assignment, or sublease. The unique situation of the Millinery Center case does offer one advantage
to the lessee, however, when he succeeds himself by purchase of the fee after he has
leased it, built, and depreciated improvements. Here the lessee-purchaser gains the
distinct advantage of being able to depreciate his own improvements twice - once
as builder-lessee, and again as purchaser-investor. The second depreciable basis is
gained by a capital outlay, thus the situation is no more anomalous than that of a
subsequent purchaser of fully depreciated property depreciating his investment. The
supposed anomaly springs only from the theoretical nature of "estimated life" concepts, and their occasional departure from reality.
These areas of uncertainty must be carefully watched by attorneys concerned
with the drafting of business leases, since the uncertainty itself indicates possible
changes in the area. But as regards the status of the lessee's improvements, rental
or non-rental, as income to the lessor, the law is apparently stable, having run the
gamut of critical appraisal since Miller v. Gearin in 1916. In general, it forms a
fairly sound foundation upon which to successfully predict the legal effects of a carefully drawn lease.
Paul B. Coffey

